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When this commentary was submitted in
April 2014, only a handful of scholars and
policy-makers in the defense and secu-
rity communities were following the Ebola
outbreak in West Africa, which was over
4 months old at that time. Now that thou-
sands of people have died, cases have spread
to the US and Europe, and thousands of
US uniformed military are being deployed
on humanitarian assistance/disaster relief
missions, attention and interest are signif-
icantly heightened. The events of the last
few months demonstrate the criticality for
interdisciplinary thinking, which is more
challenging due to different historical con-
texts, knowledge bases, interests, lexicon,
and perspectives.
This commentary will explore the cre-
ation of new relationships between deter-
rence, infectious disease, and public health
to reduce the threat of biological terrorism
and increase international security. Exam-
ining the global spread of re-emerging
infectious disease, such as the re-emergence
of polio from northern Nigeria, offers a
novel case study for thinking about how
to deter potential bioterrorists who seek
to use infectious disease. Polio outbreaks
have more directly affected the develop-
ing world compared to the US or other
nations with robust public health sectors.
This example suggests that a bioterror-
ist attack would also be more devastating
for developing countries in low-resource
settings compared to the western world.
Credibly, communicating this may offer
a new approach to deterring bioterror-
ism by foreign actors. Although a robust
public health sector has long been noted
to reduce the vulnerability to a bioterror-
ism attack, actively promoting the strength
of US public health can also serve as a
powerful deterrent in its own right. The
issue of terrorist groups utilizing biological
weapons against other states is a mounting
concern, yet little deterrence research in the
field of political science addresses methods
of dealing with the threat of bioterrorism.
Thus, creating new conversations among
the life sciences, public health, and polit-
ical science can lead to new perspectives on
deterring bioterrorism.
The issue of bioterrorism deterrence,
if addressed, has been often added or
subsumed under the auspices of deter-
rence strategies associated with nuclear
weapons. In the second half of the twenti-
eth century, nuclear deterrence dominated
geopolitics and national security strate-
gies. At its height, the threat of mutu-
ally assured destruction (MAD) existed in
which both superpowers possessed arse-
nals with second-strike capabilities, i.e., the
ability to respond to a first nuclear strike
on land via use of nearly undetectable
submarine-launched ballistic missiles with
nuclear warheads.
These historical approaches, however,
undermine and oversimplify the distinct
challenges of deterring bioterrorism. One
such method attempted is focusing on
pathogen security, or securing and deny-
ing access to the materials necessary to
develop biological weapons (i.e., deter-
rence by denial). Based on the nuclear
non-proliferation model, pathogen secu-
rity strives to control the materials, equip-
ment, and personnel involved with pro-
duction and use of biological agents. With
nuclear weapons, controlling fissile mate-
rials proved successful because of key
characteristics of the critical materials:
fissile material is man-made and can be
tracked. Those same characteristics that
make nuclear weapons easier to track are
those that make biological weapons mate-
rial difficult to monitor. These character-
istics include the presence of biological
agents in nature, lower production costs,
increased diversity of materials that could
be used in bioweapons attacks, and multi-
ple legitimate uses for biological materials.
These differing features have not always
been fully considered by policy-makers
(1). Rather than focusing solely on secur-
ing biological materials and laboratories
from misuse, other recommendations and
strategies that the US has pursued include
prevention measures such as biosurveil-
lance, global laboratory and research coop-
eration, research and development of diag-
nostics and countermeasures, international
stockpiles of effective medical countermea-
sures, and increased response and mitiga-
tion capabilities (2–6). These approaches
aim to reduce consequences of an attack,
afford earlier detection, and reduce vulner-
ability; they do not address the challenge
of deterring use and reducing motivation
directly, however.
To date, discussions about public health
and deterrence have focused on measures
such as regular vaccinations; access to
timely medical care to treat infected, iso-
late suspected infected, and mitigate the
spread of disease; confidence in the pro-
fessional nature of health providers, etc.
These are largely passive, defensive deter-
rence measures, in that they demonstrate
credible capacity by a state to respond
and mitigate the consequences of an attack
(post-exposure) or reduce vulnerability to
an attack by making it ineffective (pre-
exposure) (7–9). Both approaches men-
tioned thus far, pathogen security and a
defensive approach to terrorism, which
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ultimately aim to decrease vulnerability by
fortifying civilian populations, are exam-
ples of deterrence by denial adapted from
the realm of nuclear deterrence.
In contrast to these passive approaches,
active deterrence strategies have not been
explored. Active deterrence is actions and
policies preventing a specific opponent
from doing something they may wish to do.
Traditionally, robust active deterrence has
involved the application of expressive force
to change the policy or character of the tar-
get government or group (10). Forces and
policies are used to send a political mes-
sage. In contrast to passive strategies, active
deterrence is more dynamic and may incor-
porate escalating threats in response to an
adversary. What this would look like at the
nexus of international security and pub-
lic health is largely an unexplored area of
study or policy. Therefore, there are lim-
ited models for thinking about deterrence
that have been developed exclusively for
bioterrorism. As a consequence, the role of
a robust public health system for twenty-
first century active deterrence remains to
be explored. There has not been a substan-
tive consideration of robust public health
system as a strategic asset in a more active
deterrence role.
The threat of inflicting punishing retali-
ation against some aggressor, not the ability
to prevent some hostile act from occurring,
is the core of traditional deterrence the-
ory. Within new deterrence approaches in
political science, however, there are several
types of definable strategies that may be
applied to bioterrorism by foreign actors
(11). Indirect deterrence focuses on third
party players and their roles in terrorist
attacks. Third parties are most typically
state sponsors or supporting financiers.
This concept is based on the recognition
that while a terrorist may be willing to die
for his cause, it is less likely that explicit
and tacit supporters are willing to pay a
similar retribution. Appealing to or direct-
ing bioterrorism deterrence efforts toward
tacit supporters is an untapped area. Col-
lective actor deterrence utilizes the power
and influence of institutions like the United
Nations, NATO, or other broad coalitions
to deter terrorist actions, highlighting the
legitimacy of the organization and the
international community rather than the
interests of a single state. For bioterror-
ism, the WHO and African Union’s disease
eradication efforts are examples. Internal-
ized deterrence plays off the psyche of a
terrorist, combining abstract concepts of
criminology and social constructivism to
subconsciously deter a terrorist through
social taboos and norms (12, 13). This
might involve leveraging fear of disease
spreading to oneself or one’s own commu-
nity. Tailored deterrence attempts to indi-
vidualize each situation to reach the best
possible solution, leveraging cultural, polit-
ical, social, and other specific knowledge.
These newer deterrence strategies offer
opportunities for dealing with bioterror-
ism threats by foreign actors, which could
be combined with public health informa-
tion and resources.
In thinking about public health infra-
structure as an active or passive part of
new deterrence strategies, it is useful to
think about the role of missile defense. As
the presence of a ballistic missile defense
system is supposed to be an existential
deterrent itself, so could be a strong pub-
lic health system. Missile defense is both
a passive deterrent and, if used, an active
deterrent, as it stops something from occur-
ring. A strong public health infrastructure
is likely to be the key in reducing the vul-
nerability to bioterrorism attack, as well
as having a potential role in deterring a
foreign terrorist group from even consid-
ering such an attack. If a biological weapon
launched by a terrorist group will have little
or no effect on the target country because
of a known robust public health sector,
then a foreign terrorist may be discouraged
from launching a biological weapons attack
in the first place. If foreign terrorists are
also aware of the weak public health infra-
structure with their own borders, and the
increased risks to them and their publics
in the event of an accident in develop-
ing biological weapons and/or spread of an
infectious disease that they might launch,
this may also deter them from pursuing
this work. In addition, even the acciden-
tal release of a dangerous pathogen or the
spread of an infectious disease via attack
will most likely cause disproportional neg-
ative effects to nations with limited public
health infrastructures and affect tacit and
explicit supporters in those states.
The role of a robust public health-
care system for its deterrence capacity can
be explored through empirically driven
case study methods against predominant
theories of deterrence in political science
(14, 15) and in comparison to other works
considering the possibility of deterring
bioterrorism (16–20). For example, the re-
emergence of polio offers a potentially use-
ful example to think about the effects of a
potential bioterrorist attack on the devel-
oped and the developing world. Polio is
both a contagious infectious disease and
transmissible from human-to-human (like
smallpox and plague). The poliovirus is
highly transmissible with a basic reproduc-
tive rate or secondary transmission rate
(R0) exceeding most suspected biological
agents, e.g., standard estimates of R0 for
polio range from 5 to 7 (21, 22), whereas R0
for suspected bioterrorist agents like small-
pox (1.8–3.2) (23–25); pneumonic plague
(0.8–3.0) (26, 27); and even Ebola (1.34–
2.0) (28, 29) are lower. It is not a likely bio-
logical terrorism agent, however, due to the
low-mortality associated with infection. It
is, however, a useful model for thinking
about the spread of infectious disease and
the importance of a robust public health
infrastructure as a deterrence strategy.
At the beginning of 2003, the complete
eradication of polio appeared to be within
the grasp of the World Health Association
and its many partners. In 1998, the World
Health Organization estimated there were
over 365,000 new cases of polio; by early
2003, the rate of infection had declined
to <1,000 new cases worldwide due to a
vigilant vaccination effort (30). That trend
was interrupted, however, when Nigerian
citizens refused to be vaccinated after hear-
ing unfounded allegations of contaminated
vaccines that would lead to sterility or
cause HIV/AIDs. Before 2003, polio had
largely been confined to only a hand-
ful of countries; Nigeria, India, Pakistan,
and Afghanistan accounted for 93% of the
world’s cases (31). What started with the
refusal of local clerics to allow vaccination
led to the reestablishment or importation
of the poliovirus to 14 countries that were
previously disease-free.
Transport of the contagious virus was
not limited to neighboring African states.
The poliovirus moved through Sudan to
Ethiopia crossing the Red Sea to Lebanon
and Yemen. The latter was been particularly
severely affected, witnessing more than 500
new cases in the first half of 2005. The
poliovirus spread as far as Indonesia, where
it afflicted more than 150 people in a
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single year in 2 provinces, predominantly
children (32). Prior to this outbreak,
Indonesia had been polio free for nine
years. Genetic fingerprinting confirmed
that the strain imported to Indonesia came
from northern Nigeria through Sudan,
most closely resembling an isolate recov-
ered in Saudi Arabia in December 2004. A
pilgrim returning from Mecca or a return-
ing foreign worker is suspected to have
brought the virus to the island of Java,
across an ocean and thousands of miles
from its source. The polio virus contin-
ues to persist in a limited number of
states in the developing world, specifi-
cally in Nigeria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan,
where a ban on vaccination by Islamist
leaders in Waziristan remains in place.
Since 2013, polio (linked genetically to the
strain in Pakistan) has spread from Syria to
Iraq (33).
Countries that have witnessed the re-
emergence of poliovirus outbreaks have
some crucial links: social and political chal-
lenges that have impeded the development
and implementation of appropriate public
health infrastructures and measures. Not
unexpectedly, there is an inverse relation-
ship between government health expen-
diture in health and number of polio
cases.
Looking at the spread of polio can
provide us with a lens to think about
the impacts of bioterrorism in states with
developed public health infrastructures
and those who do not. A bioterrorist attack,
especially one with a contagious agent like
smallpox or pneumonic plague, will likely
impact the developing parts of the world
substantially more than the US. One only
has to look as far as polio’s re-emergence
(or more recently the outbreak of Ebola
virus disease in West Africa) to see the very
real repercussions of a contagious virus and
how the most dire causes and effects of
infection and spread stem from poor public
health infrastructures (34).
Creating a new deterrence strategy
for bioterrorism is needed. Credibly,
communicating the differential capaci-
ties to respond and the comparative
likely outcomes will require diplomacy,
coordination with civil affairs, special-
ized knowledge of individual states, and
regions of the developing world. These
are fundamentally interdisciplinary efforts
that should leverage small teams from
diplomatic, development, public health,
and defense communities. One single
parochial voice will be inadequate. Fur-
ther improving the US domestic public
health infrastructure would be beneficial
and cost effective regardless of whether
an outbreak is intentional or natural.
The devastating Ebola outbreaks serve as
a call for urgent investment in public
health infrastructures worldwide, to pro-
vide both responsive and proactive actions
to deter bioterrorism and to deal with
natural disease outbreaks. Public health
remains a powerful and often underuti-
lized asset for bioweapons defense through
vulnerability reduction; leveraging public
health may also enable new approaches
to deterring bioterrorism threats. Inter-
national security scholars would benefit
from better understanding of and lever-
aging the knowledge of the public health
community.
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